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Of course, the U.S. military learned this lesson in Iraq. Indeed, as the American Enterprise Institute’s Frederick W. Kagan, has observed
Perhaps the most important lesson of Iraq that is transportable to Afghanistan is this: It is impossible to conduct effective counterterrorism operations (i.e., targeting terrorist networks with precise attacks on key leadership nodes) in a fragile state without conducting effective counterinsurgency operations (i.e., protecting the population and using economic and political programs to build support for the government and resistance to insurgents and terrorists).
In fact, Kagan notes, a counterterrorism policy was tried in Iraq in 2006, before the surge, and it failed miserably.
U.S. Special Forces teams had complete freedom to act against al-Qaeda in Iraq, supported by around 150,000 regular U.S. troops, Iraqi military and police forces of several hundred thousand, and liberal airpower. We killed scores of key terrorist leaders, including the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, in June 2006.
But terrorist strength, violence, and control only increased over the course of that year. It was not until units already on the ground applied a new approach—a counterinsurgency approach—and received reinforcements that we were able to defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq (even without killing its new leader).
The bottom line: the terrorists are like cockroaches: They are not easy to kill and are largely immune to traditional and conventional warfare. Thus, our only hope for defeating them lies in a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy that strikes at the nihilistic culture which supports and sustains them.
You can follow John Guardiano on Twitter: @JohnRGuardiano
